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This paper measures the unemployment gap (the difference between actual and
efcient unemployment rates) using the Beveridge curve (the negative relationship
between unemployment and job vacancies). We express the unemployment gap
as a function of current unemployment and vacancy rates, and three sufcient
statistics: elasticity of the Beveridge curve, recruiting cost, and nonpecuniary value
of unemployment. In the United States, we nd that the efcient unemployment rate
started around 3% in the 1950s, steadily climbed to almost 6% in the 1980s, fell just
below 4% in the early 1990s, and remained at that level until 2019. These variations
are caused by changes in the level and elasticity of the Beveridge curve. Hence, the US
unemployment gap is almost always positive and highly countercyclical—indicating
that the labor market tends to be inefciently slack, especially in slumps.
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1. Introduction
The unemployment gap—the distance between actual and efcient unemployment rates—is a
key statistic for macroeconomic policy. In practice, many governments are mandated to reduce
the unemployment gap to zero. For example, in the United States, the Humphrey-Hawkins Full
Employment Act of 1978 mandates the government to maintain the economy at “full employ-
ment.” Since achieving zero unemployment is physically impossible, full employment should
not be interpreted as zero unemployment but rather as an efcient amount of unemployment;
the mandate of US policymakers therefore is to close the unemployment gap. In theory, many
optimal policies also depend on the distance from labor-market efciency, measured by the
unemployment gap: hiring and employment subsidies and ring tax (Pissarides 2000, chap. 9);
minimum wage (Hungerbuhler and Lehmann 2009); monetary policy (Michaillat and Saez 2014);
public expenditure (Michaillat and Saez 2019); income tax (Kro et al. 2019); and short-time work
(Giupponi and Landais 2018). Yet, perhaps surprisingly, there does not exist any broadly accepted
measure of the unemployment gap.
This paper develops a measure of the unemployment gap based on the Beveridge curve. The
curve depicts a negative relationship between unemployment and job vacancies. It was rst
identied by Beveridge (1944) and Dow and Dicks-Mireaux (1958) in the United Kingdom, and
has since been observed in many countries (Jackman, Pissarides, and Savouri 1990; Nickell et al.
2002; Elsby, Michaels, and Ratner 2015), including the United States (Blanchard and Diamond
1989; Diamond and Sahin 2015; Elsby, Michaels, and Ratner 2015). The Beveridge curve is key to
determining the efcient unemployment rate because it governs the welfare tradeoff between
unemployment and vacancies. Both unemployment and vacancies come with welfare costs:
more unemployment means fewer productive resources; more vacancies means more productive
resources diverted to recruiting. Yet the Beveridge curve shows that both cannot be reduced at
the same time: less unemployment requires more vacancies, and conversely fewer vacancies
create more unemployment. Our analysis determines the efcient unemployment rate: the rate
at which welfare is maximized.
We begin by expressing the unemployment gap as a function of actual unemployment and
vacancy rates, and three sufcient statistics: elasticity of the Beveridge curve, recruiting cost, and
nonpecuniary value of unemployment. These statistics enter the formula because they determine
the marginal welfare cost and benet from changing unemployment, and ultimately the efcient
rate of unemployment. Consider for instance a small decrease in unemployment. On the plus
side, market production mechanically increases. On the minus side, newly employed workers
forgo the nonpecuniary value of unemployment, such as home production. Also on the minus
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side, more vacancies are required to sustain lower unemployment, as described by the Beveridge
curve, which forces rms to allocate more workers to recruiting, thus reducing production. We
obtain our formula from the condition that when unemployment is efcient, the pluses and
minuses balance out.
Next, we apply our unemployment-gap formula to the United States. We nd that the efcient
unemployment rate started around 3% in the 1950s, steadily climbed to almost 6% in the 1980s, fell
just below 4% in the early 1990s, and remained at that level until 2019. These variations are caused
by changes in the level and elasticity of the Beveridge curve. Hence, the US unemployment gap is
almost always positive—indicating that the labor market does not generally operate efciently,
but tends to be inefciently slack. The unemployment gap is especially high in slumps: as high as
5 percentage points in 1982, 3.9 points in 1992, and 6.2 points in 2010. Thus, it would be benecial
to implement stabilization policies that reduce unemployment in bad times.
Of the three statistics in our formula, the most uncertain is the nonpecuniary value of un-
employment. Our mid-range estimate of the nonpecuniary value of unemployment relative to
employment is 0.24 (see Borgschulte and Martorell 2018), suggesting that unemployed workers
derive a small value from unemployment—from added leisure or home production. Yet, survey
evidence suggests that the nonpecuniary value of unemployment could be quite negative, possibly
due to lower mental health. Using such survey calibration, the efcient unemployment rate is a
bit lower, around 3%. At the other end of the range of available estimates, some macro studies
argue that the nonpecuniary value of unemployment could be almost as high as labor productivity
(see Hagedorn and Manovskii 2008). Under such calibration the efcient unemployment rate
is much higher, above 13%, so that unemployment is always inefciently low, even at the peak
of the Great Recession. This result seems implausible, suggesting that such macro calibration
overstates the nonpecuniary value of unemployment.
Conceptually, our measure of the unemployment gap is quite different from the two com-
mon measures in the literature (see Crump et al. 2019). The rst common measure is the gap
between actual unemployment and its secular trend. This measure and ours differ because trend
unemployment is separate from efcient unemployment. Indeed, unemployment is generally not
efcient on average (Pissarides 2000, chap. 8). The second common measure is the gap between
actual unemployment and the non-accelerating ination rate of unemployment (NAIRU, obtained
by estimating a Phillips curve). This measure and ours differ because the NAIRU is not a measure
of labor-market efciency (Rogerson 1997).
Methodologically, our approach to measuring the unemployment gap differs from the typical
macroeconomic approach. Themacro approach consists in computing the unemployment gap by
simulating a calibrated model of the economy subject to real-time shocks (for example, Gertler,
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Sala, and Trigari 2008; Gali, Smets, and Wouters 2012). It requires an accurate structural model
of the economy, and real-time observations of all the shocks disturbing the economy. It thus
faces two difculties: all available models are somewhat controversial, and shocks are incredibly
difcult to estimate (Hall 2005c). To tackle these difculties, we import the sufcient-statistic
method from public economics (Chetty 2009). Our formula requires little theoretical structure
and therefore applies to a broad range of models: it applies to any model admitting a Beveridge
curve, and does not require any assumptions about labor-market structure, wage setting, labor
demand, or underlying shocks. Second, our formula only involves potentially estimable statistics,
so it can be used to measure the unemployment gap in real time.
Finally, our formula can be seen as a reformulation of the well-known Hosios condition. Like
us, Hosios (1990) resolves the tradeoff between unemployment and vacancies tomaximizewelfare.
He then derives a condition to ensure that when wages are determined by Nash bargaining, labor
market efciency is achieved. The condition is thatworkers’ bargaining power equals the elasticity
of the matching function with respect to unemployment. But measuring workers’ bargaining
power is notoriously challenging (Pissarides 2000, p. 229).1 Moreover, Nash bargaining does not
seem to describe well wage-setting at business-cycle frequency (Shimer 2005; Hall 2005a; Jager
et al. 2018). For these reasons we do not attempt to use the Hosios condition to measure the
unemployment gap. Instead, we derive a formula that links the efcient unemployment rate to
observable labor market statistics. Our formula also slightly generalizes the Hosios condition
in that it applies not only to models with a matching function and Nash bargaining, but also to
other models with a Beveridge curve, irrespective of their wage-setting mechanism.
2. Beveridgean labor market
We introduce the labor market model used to compute the unemployment-gap formula. The
main ingredient is a Beveridge curve: a decreasing function giving the vacancy rate prevailing on
the labor market for any unemployment rate. Because of the Beveridge curve, there always are
unemployed workers and vacant jobs. Moreover, the number of unemployed workers and vacant
jobs is generally inefcient.
1The challenge is such that the bargaining power is usually simply calibrated to 0.5 (for example, den Haan,
Ramey, and Watson 2000; Pissarides 2000; Gertler and Trigari 2009) or to the value implied by the Hosios condition
(for example, Mortensen and Pissarides 1994; Shimer 2005; Costain and Reiter 2008).
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2.1. Beveridge curve
We consider a labor market with both unemployed workers and vacant jobs. The unemployment
rateu is the number of unemployed workers divided by size of the labor force. The vacancy rate
v is the number of vacancies divided by size of the labor force. The labor market tightness is the
ratio of vacancy rate to unemployment rate: θ = v/u.
Unemployment rate and vacancy rate are related by a Beveridge curve. Formally, the vacancy
rate is given by the functionv(u), which is strictly decreasing and convex. A key statistic in the
measure of the unemployment gap is the Beveridge elasticity:
Definition 1. The Beveridge elasticity is the elasticity of the vacancy rate with respect to the
unemployment rate along the Beveridge curve, normalized to be positive:
ϵ = − u
v(u)v
′(u) = −d ln(v(u))
d ln(u) .
The Beveridge curve is clearly visible on the US labor market since the 1950s. To display it,
we need measures of the unemployment and vacancy rates. For the unemployment rate, we use
the measure constructed by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) from the Current Population
Survey (CPS) (gure 1, panel A). For the vacancy rate, we use two different sources because there
is no continuous national vacancy series in the United States over the period. For the 1951Q1–
2000Q4 period, we use the vacancy proxy constructed by Barnichon (2010). Barnichon starts from
the help-wanted advertising index constructed by the Conference Board—a proxy for vacancies
proposed by Abraham (1987), which has become standard (Shimer 2005, p. 29). He then corrects
the Conference Board index, which is based on newspaper advertisements, to take into account
the shi from print advertising to online advertising aer 1995.2 Finally, he rescales the index
into vacancies, and divides the vacancy number by the size of the labor force to obtain a vacancy
rate.3 For the 2001Q1–2019Q2 period, we obtain the vacancy rate from the number of job openings
measured by the BLS in the Job Opening and Labor Turnover Survey (JOLTS), divided by the
civilian labor force constructed by the BLS from the CPS. We then splice the Barnichon and JOLTS
series to obtain a vacancy rate for 1951Q1–2019Q2 (gure 1, panel B).
The Beveridge curve appears in scatter plots of unemployment and vacancy rates (panels C
andD of gure 1; for readability, we separately plot the 1951Q1–1987Q3 and 1987Q4–2019Q2 periods).
2Abraham (1987) was concerned that the Conference Board index might have been a biased proxy for vacancies
in the 1970s and 1980s, because at that time, the structure of the newspaper industry signicantly changed, and
business changed how they used help-wanted advertising in response to antidiscrimation laws. However, Zagorsky
(1998, p. 343) nds that such bias is minimal, and that the Conference Board index tracks vacancies well until 1994.
3The conversion of the index into a vacancy rate is not in Barnichon’s article but is implemented in the 2016
version of the vacancy proxy, available at https://sites.google.com/site/regisbarnichon/research.
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Figure 1. Beveridge curve in the United States, 1951Q1–2019Q2
Panel A: The unemployment rate is constructed by the BLS from the CPS. Panel B: For 1951Q1–2000Q4, the vacancy
rate is constructed by Barnichon (2010) from the Conference Board help-wanted advertising index; for 2001Q1–2019Q2,
the vacancy rate is the number of job openings measured by the BLS in JOLTS, divided by the civilian labor force
constructed by the BLS from the CPS. All unemployment and vacancy rates are quarterly averages of seasonally
adjusted monthly series. The shaded areas represent recessions, as identied by the National Bureau of Economic
Research (NBER). Panels C & D: The Beveridge curve is a scatter plot of log unemployment rate (from panel A) vs. log
vacancy rate (from panel B). Panel C depicts the 1951Q1–1987Q3 period, and panel D the 1987Q3–2019Q2 period. The
panels highlight in color the subperiods during which the Beveridge curve was stable: 1951Q1–1959Q2, 1959Q4–1971Q1,
1971Q3–1975Q1, 1975Q3–1987Q3, 1990Q2–1999Q1, 2001Q1–2009Q3, and 2010Q1–2019Q2. In-between quarters, during
which the Beveridge curve shis, are depicted in gray.
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TheBeveridge curve is stable over long periods of time, and shis outward or inward every so oen.
The Beveridge curve was stable for seven subperiods, during which unemployment and vacancies
moved up and down along a clearly dened curve: 1951Q1–1959Q2, 1959Q4–1971Q1, 1971Q3–1975Q1,
1975Q3–1987Q3, 1990Q2–1999Q1, 2001Q1–2009Q3, and 2010Q1–2019Q2. At the end of the rst three
subperiods, the Beveridge curve shied outward. Aer the 1975Q3–1987Q3 and 1990Q2–1999Q1
subperiods, the Beveridge curve shied back inward. Finally, aer the 2001Q1–2009Q3 subperiod,
at the end of the Great Recession, the Beveridge curve shied back outward.
Another property of the empirical Beveridge curve is that all its branches (plotted in log)
seem almost perfectly linear, suggesting that each branch is isoelastic.
Seeing a Beveridge curve on the US labor market is not surprising: its presence has long
been established (Blanchard and Diamond 1989; Diamond and Sahin 2015; Elsby, Michaels, and
Ratner 2015). The Beveridge curve has also been observed in numerous other countries (Jackman,
Pissarides, and Savouri 1990; Nickell et al. 2002; Elsby, Michaels, and Ratner 2015).
Many labor market models feature a Beveridge curve and are therefore covered by our frame-
work (Elsby, Michaels, and Ratner 2015). Importantly, models build around standard matching
functions exhibit a Beveridge curve (Petrongolo and Pissarides 2001, eq. (12)).4 This category
includes the canonical Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides model (Pissarides 2000, chap. 1; Shimer
2005); but also its variants with rigid wages (Hall 2005a; Hall and Milgrom 2008), with large rms
(Cahuc, Marque, and Wasmer 2008; Elsby and Michaels 2013), or with job rationing (Michaillat
2012). Even models without a matching function may feature a Beveridge curve: for instance,
models of mismatch (Shimer 2007) and of stock-ow matching (Ebrahimy and Shimer 2010).
2.2. Social welfare
The Beveridge curve determines the tradeoff between unemployment and vacancies. Both have
welfare costs, which we describe here.
Vacancies. The welfare cost of vacancies arises because lling a vacancy requires labor: ρ > 0
workers per unit time.Hence, vacancies divert labor away fromproduction and toward recruiting—
4In many models with a matching function, the unemployment rate follows a law of motion, and the Beveridge
curve is dened as the locus of unemployment and vacancy rates that are consistent with a stable level of unem-
ployment in the absence of shocks. Technically, therefore, unemployment and vacancy rates may not be on the
Beveridge curve if unemployment moves very slowly over time. However, as noted by Pissarides (2009a, p. 236),
“Perhaps surprisingly at rst, but on reection not so surprisingly, we get a good approximation to the dynamics
of unemployment if we treat unemployment as if it were always on the Beveridge curve.” The reason is that labor
market ows are so large that aer a shock, the unemployment rate adjusts very rapidly to its new stable level, where
inows into unemployment equal outows from unemployment (Pissarides 1986; Hall 2005b; Pissarides 2009b; Elsby,
Michaels, and Solon 2009; Shimer 2012).
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an activity that does not directly contribute to welfare.
The share of the labor force devoted to lling vacancies at any point in time is ρv. Recruiters
spend time and effort nding appropriate workers for their rm. As a result, the recruiters do not
have time to produce the goods and services sold by rms to consumers. In contrast, a fraction n
of the labor force is devoted to the production of goods or services eventually consumed by rms’
customers. Since all workers are either producers or recruiters, and since the employment rate is
1 − u, the share of producers in the labor force is
n = 1 − u − ρv .
The number of producers is below the size of the labor force because some workers do not nd
jobs (u > 0), and some workers are allocated to recruiting instead of producing (ρv > 0).
Unemployment. Welfare is determined by the number of producers and unemployed workers.
Unemployed workers contribute positively to welfare if they enjoy additional utility from leisure
or through home production; they contribute negatively if they suffer mental and physical health
cost or loss of human capital. Since the size of the labor force is taken as given, we assume that
welfare is given by a functionW(n,u), whereu is the unemployment rate, n is the share of the
labor force that is employed and devoted to production of consumption goods and services, and
the functionW is strictly increasing in both arguments.
The welfare cost of unemployment arises because unemployed workers contribute less to
social welfare than production workers (if not, it would be optimal to have everybody unem-
ployed). A key statistic in the measure of the unemployment gap is the nonpecuniary value of
unemployment relative to production:
Definition 2. The nonpecuniary value of unemployment is the marginal rate of transformation
between unemployed workers and production workers in the welfare function:
z =
∂W/∂u
∂W/∂n < 1.
The statistic z captures the value of leisure and of home production, net of the psychological
costs of being unemployed, relative to the value of market production. It measures the resource
value/cost of unemployment and hence should not include unemployment benets, which are
transfers from employed to unemployed workers. Accordingly, as in Hosios (1990), our analysis
abstracts from the issue of insurance—which is covered by Landais, Michaillat, and Saez (2018a,b).
The textbook Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides model, with linear production and utility func-
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tions, provides a simple example of welfare function. Assume that the size of the labor force
is 1; the productivity of employed workers is a; and the productivity of unemployed workers in
home production is a × h, where the presence of the factor a reects the fact that technological
advances benet both rm and home production (appliances, computers, infrastructure, and so
on), and h < 1 is labor productivity at home relative to on the job. Assume also that the value of
time is the same at home and on the job. The welfare function then is
W(n,u) = an + ahu = (n + hu)a.
Here the nonpecuniary value of unemployment simply is z = h.
3. Unemployment-gap formula
Werst provide a graphical representation of the efcient unemployment rate andunemployment
gap in a Beveridge plan. Then we develop a sufcient-statistic formula for the unemployment
gap. The formulas apply to any labor market model in which unemployment and vacancy rates
are related by a Beveridge curve.
Definition 3. Social welfare is given by the following function of the unemployment rate u:
(1) W(1 − u − ρv(u),u),
whereW(n,u) is the welfare function, ρ is the recruiting cost, and v(u) is the Beveridge curve.
The ecient unemployment rate, denotedu∗, maximizes social welfare. The ecient vacancy rate
is v∗ = v(u∗), the ecient labor market tightness is θ ∗ = u∗/v∗, and the unemployment gap is
u − u∗.
As in Hosios (1990), we determine the unemployment rate that maximizes welfare at any
point in time. We do not incorporate any dynamical elements to the analysis. This simplication
allows us to obtain a simple graphical representation and a sufcient-statistic formula.
3.1. Representation in Beveridge plan
Since the efcient unemployment rate maximizes (1), it satises the rst-order condition
[1 + ρv′(u)] ∂W
∂n
=
∂W
∂u
.
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Aer dividing by ∂W/∂n and reshufing the terms, we obtain
(2) v′(u) = −1 − z
ρ
.
We assume that themaximization problem is well behaved: the functionu 7→ W(1−u−ρv(u),u)
admits a unique extremum, and the extremum is an interior maximum. Under this assumption,
(2) is a necessary and sufcient condition for optimality. This gives us a rst result:
Proposition 1. In a Beveridge plan, the ecient unemployment rate is found at the point where
the Beveridge curve is tangent to a downward-sloping line with slope −(1 − z)/ρ, where z < 1 is
the nonpecuniary value of unemployment and ρ > 0 is the recruiting cost.
This result is depicted on gure 2, panel A. The graph shows a standard Beveridge plan,
with unemployment rate on the x -axis and vacancy rate on the y-axis. The Beveridge curve
is a downward-sloping and convex curve in the plan. The efcient unemployment rate, and
corresponding efcient vacancy rate, are found at the point of tangency between the Beveridge
curve and a downward-sloping line with slope −(1 − z)/ρ.
Formula (2) transparently describes the determinants of the efcient unemployment rate.
When the labor market operates efciently we have (2), so
(3) 1 − z = −ρv′(u).
The condition says that at efciency, welfare costs and benets frommoving one worker from
unemployment to employment are equalized. When one worker moves from unemployment to
employment, more welfare is produced since z < 1. Hence, the welfare contribution of an extra
job is 1 − z. At the same time, there is a tradeoff between unemployment and vacancies: having
one less unemployed worker means having −v′(u) > 0more vacancies, which diverts an extra
ρ[−v′(u)]workers away from production and toward recruiting. Hence, the welfare cost of an
extra job is ρ[−v′(u)].
The representation of the efcient unemployment rate in the Beveridge plan offers several
comparative-static results, illustrated in panels B, C, and D of gure 2:
Corollary 1. The ecient unemployment rate increases in the following cases
• when the recruiting cost increases;
• when the nonpecuniary value of unemployment increases;
• when the Beveridge elasticity increases;
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• and when mismatch increases (such that the Beveridge curve becomes µ × v(u) where µ > 1
is the mismatch factor).
The intuitions are simple. When unemployment is more valuable (higher nonpecuniary
value) or vacancies are more costly (higher recruiting cost), then the efcient unemployment rate
increases. When reducing unemployment requires more vacancies (higher Beveridge elasticity),
then vacancy-unemployment tradeoff becomes less favorable to unemployment, and the efcient
unemployment rate increases. The same mechanism operates with an increase in mismatch. At
any unemployment rate, the Beveridge curve becomes steeper (the derivative becomes µv′(u) >
v′(u)), so reducing unemployment requires more vacancies, which implies a higher efcient
unemployment rate.
Over the business cycle, the unemployment and vacancy rates move along the Beveridge
curve (gure 1, panels C and D).When ρ and z remain stable, suchmovements lead to uctuations
in the unemployment gap. In slumps (gure 2, panel E), the unemployment rate is too high, the
vacancy rate is too low, and the unemployment gap is positive. In booms (gure 2, panel F),
the unemployment rate is too low, the vacancy rate is too high, and the unemployment gap is
negative.
3.2. Expression in terms of sufcient statistics
We rework the optimality condition (2) to obtain a formula that we can use to measure the
unemployment gap in real time. The issue with (2) is that the slope of the Beveridge curvev′(u)
changes over time, so it would be difcult to estimate in real time. In contrast, the Beveridge
elasticity ϵ = −(u/v)v′(u) = −v′(u)/θ is stable over time, as showed by the linearity of the
branches of the Beveridge curve (gure 1, panels C and D). We therefore re-express (2) with the
Beveridge elasticity:
−v
′(u)
θ
· θ = 1 − z
ρ
,
which gives at the optimum ϵθ = (1 − z)/ρ. Hence the efcient labor market tightness only
depends on three sufcient statistics:
Proposition 2. The ecient labor market tightness only depends on the Beveridge elasticity (ϵ),
recruiting cost (ρ), and nonpecuniary value of unemployment (z):
(4) θ ∗ =
1 − z
ρϵ
.
Condition (4) gives the labor market tightness that maximizes welfare on a Beveridgean
labor market, where unemployed workers and vacant jobs coexist. The condition involves the
10
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Figure 2. Efcient unemployment rate and unemployment gap in Beveridge plan
Panel A depicts the derivation of the efcient unemployment rate in the Beveridge diagram. The parameter z is the
nonpecuniary value of unemployment (relative to production), and the parameter ρ is the recruiting cost (labor cost
of posting a vacancy). Panel B shows that the efcient unemployment rate increases when the recruiting cost or the
nonpecuniary value of unemployment increases. Panel C shows that the efcient unemployment rate increases when
mismatch increases. Panel D shows that the efcient unemployment rate increases when the Beveridge elasticity
increases. Panels E & F describe inefcient labor markets: unemployment and vacancies satisfy the Beveridge
curve but not the efciency condition. Panel E depicts a slump: unemployment is inefciently high, vacancies are
inefciently low, and there is a positive unemployment gap. Panel F depicts a boom: unemployment is inefciently
low, vacancies are inefciently high, and there is a negative unemployment gap.
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Beveridge elasticity ϵ because it controls the tradeoff between unemployment and vacancies. It
also features the two parameters measuring the welfare cost of unemployment and vacancies:
the nonpecuniary value of unemployment z < 1 and the recruiting cost ρ > 0.
We expect the efcient tightness to be fairly stable over time because it is unaffected by two
prevalent labormarket shocks. First, it is unaffected by labor-demand shocks, such as productivity
shocks, wage shocks, or aggregate demand shocks. These shocks move the labor market along
the Beveridge curve without affecting z or ρ. Second, it is unaffected by mismatch shocks, which
shi the Beveridge curve inward or outward without affecting ϵ .
The efcient labor market tightness is easy to visualize on the diagrams in gure 2: it is the
slope of the origin line going through the efcient point on the Beveridge curve.
With (4) in hand, we can obtain a formula for the unemployment gap. Guided by the evidence
from panels C and D in gure 1, we assume that the Beveridge curve is isoelastic:
v(u) = v0 · u−ϵ ,
with Beveridge elasticity ϵ > 0. This isoelastic expression implies that along the Beveridge curve,
tightness is related to unemployment rate by θ = v(u)/u = v0u−(1+ϵ) and θ ∗ = v0(u∗)−(1+ϵ). The
link between efcient tightness and efcient unemployment rate implies thatu∗ = (θ ∗/vo)−1/(1+ϵ).
Hence, in addition to the factors affecting the efcient tightness, the efcient unemployment
rate is also affected by shis in the Beveridge curve (changes inv0). This implies that in theory,
the efcient labor market tightness is more stable than the efcient unemployment rate.
From the previous relationships, we link the unemployment gap to the tightness gap:
u∗
u
=
(
θ
θ ∗
)1/(1+ϵ)
.
Hence the unemployment gap only depends on current unemployment and vacancy rates, and
the same three sufcient statistics:
Proposition 3. The ecient unemployment rate and unemployment gap can be measured from
current unemployment rate (u), current vacancy rate (v), Beveridge elasticity (ϵ), recruiting cost
(ρ), and nonpecuniary value of unemployment (z). The ecient unemployment rate is given by
(5) u∗ =
( ρϵ
1 − z ·
v
u
)1/(1+ϵ)
u,
from which the unemployment gap u − u∗ immediately follows.
The proposition gives an explicit formula for the unemployment gap, expressed in terms of
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observable sufcient statistics. It is valid in any Beveridgean labor market model, irrespective of
rms’ production function, workers’ utility function, the wage mechanism, or the structure of
the labor market. Another advantage of our formula is that we do not need to take a stand on or
measure the shocks disturbing the labor market: productivity, wage, labor-force participation,
matching function, job separations, and so on. The sufcient statistics are all we need to observe.
4. Unemployment gap in the United States, 1951–2019
We apply formula (5) to measure the unemployment gap in the United States over the 1951–2019
period. The rst step is to measure the following statistics: Beveridge elasticity (ϵ), recruiting
cost (ρ), and nonpecuniary value of unemployment (z). We also compare our unemployment-gap
measure to other existing measures, and we describe its sensitivity to the nonpecuniary value of
unemployment.
4.1. Beveridge elasticity
We estimate the Beveridge elasticity ϵ by OLS regression of log vacancy rate on log unemployment
rate. Since the Beveridge curve shis over time, we separately estimate the elasticity on the
seven subperiods during which the Beveridge curve was stable: 1951Q1–1959Q2, 1959Q4–1971Q1,
1971Q3–1975Q1, 1975Q3–1987Q3, 1990Q2–1999Q1, 2001Q1–2009Q3, and 2010Q1–2019Q2 (gure 1).
One such regression is illustrated in gure 3, panel A; the regression results on each subsample
are summarized in gure 3, panel B.5
We nd that during the 1951–2019 period, the Beveridge elasticity uctuates between 0.84 and
1.24. The Beveridge elasticity steadily increased from 0.92 in the 1950s to 1.24 in the 1980s, before
suddenly dropping back below 1 in 1990, and dropping further to 0.84 in 2010. Furthermore the
t of the seven linear regressions is very good: the R2 varies between 0.90 and 0.97. Such high R2
conrms that unemployment and vacancy travel on tightly dened branches of the Beveridge
curve, and that each branch is almost perfectly isoelastic.
4.2. Recruiting cost
To construct the recruiting cost ρ, we rely on the evidence from the 1997National Employer Survey:
in this survey, the Census Bureau asked 4,500 establishments about their recruiting process, and
found that rms spend 2.5% of their labor costs on recruiting (Villena Roldan 2010). This means
that in 1997, ρv = 2.5% × (1 − u). Moreover, the average vacancy rate in 1997 is 3.3% (gure 1,
5The Beveridge elasticity is precisely estimated: across the seven regressions the standard error varies between
0.02 and 0.10.
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panel B). At the same time, the average unemployment rate is 4.9% (gure 1, panel A). Hence,
using these 1997 data, we nd that the recruiting cost is ρ = 2.5% × (1 − 4.9%)/3.3% = 0.72.
As there is no other comprehensive measure of recruiting cost at other dates in the United
States, we assume that the recruiting cost remains constant at its 1997 value.
4.3. Nonpecuniary value of unemployment
The nonpecuniary value of unemployment z measures the well-being of an unemployed worker,
without receiving anymonetary transfers from the government or others, relative to the productiv-
ity of an employed worker. To measure it, we rely on the work of Borgschulte andMartorell (2018).
Using military administrative data for the 1993–2004 period, they study how servicemembers’
choice between reenlisting and exiting the military is affected by the unemployment rate in
the local labor market where they would enter. They are able to measure the dollar value of
utility lost in the transition to civilian employment when unemployment is one percentage point
higher, and compare this value to actual earnings losses for military leavers subject to different
labor markets. Their main nding is that between 13% and 35% of the estimated earnings loss
(the value of employment) is offset by leisure and home production (the nonpecuniary value of
unemployment) as well as by public benets (the pecuniary value of unemployment)—giving a
midpoint of 24%.
Since servicemembers’ benets are not observed in the dataset, we abstract from benets
and set the nonpecuniary value of unemployment to z = 0.24. (Accounting for benets would
reduce z further.) And since we have no evidence on the time variations of the nonpecuniary
value of unemployment, we assume it to be constant.
4.4. Unemployment gap
Using formula (5), the calibrated statistics, and the unemployment and vacancy rates fromgure 1,
we nowmeasure the unemployment gap in the United States between 1951 and 2019.
We begin by computing the efcient labor market tightness using formula (4) (gure 3, panel
C). Mirroring the movements of the Beveridge elasticity, the efcient tightness falls between the
1950s and the 1980s, from 1.14 down to 0.85; it moves back to 1.16 in the 1990s and 1.09 in the 2000s;
and it climbs to 1.25 in the 2010s. Compared to its efcient level, actual tightness was almost
always too low during the period. The only two episodes when tightness was inefciently high
were 1951–1953, during the Korea war, and 1965–1970, at the peak of the Vietnam war; tightness is
virtually efcient in 2019. This implies that the US labor market is generally inefciently slack.
Next, applying formula (5), we compute the efcient unemployment rate (gure 3, panel
14
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Figure 3. Unemployment gap in the United States, 1951Q1–2019Q2
Panels A & B: We estimate the Beveridge elasticity ϵ with OLS regressions of log vacancy rate (from gure 1, panel B)
on log unemployment rate (from gure 1, panel A) for seven subperiods: 1951Q1–1959Q2, 1959Q4–1971Q1, 1971Q3–
1975Q1, 1975Q3–1987Q3, 1990Q2–1999Q1, 2001Q1–2009Q3, and 2010Q1–2019Q2. Panel A illustrates, as an example, the
estimation of ϵ for 2010Q1–2019Q2; the slope of the regression line gives ϵ = 0.84. Panel B depicts the estimated
values of ϵ for all subperiods. Panel C: Actual tightness is vacancy rate divided by unemployment rate (from gure 1).
Efcient tightness is computed from (4) with ρ = 0.72, z = 0.24, and ϵ from panel B. Panel D: Actual unemployment
rate comes from gure 1, panel A. Efcient unemployment rate is computed from (5) using the same statistics as
efcient tightness. Panel E reproduces panel D with the calibration of the nonpecuniary value of unemployment
due to Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008): z = 0.96. Panel F depicts the average value over 1951–2019 of the efcient
unemployment rate obtained for each nonpecuniary value of unemployment z ∈ [−0.5, 0.96]. It highlights our
calibration of z, due to Borgschulte and Martorell (2018): z = 0.24; the calibration of z from Hagedorn and Manovskii
(2008): z = 0.96; the average US unemployment rate over 1951–2019: u = 5.8%; and the average of CBO’s natural
unemployment rate over 1951–2019:u = 5.5%. The shaded areas represent recessions, as identied by the NBER.
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D). The efcient unemployment rate hovered around 3% in the 1950s, rose to 4% in the 1960s,
and steadily climbed to reach 5.8% in 1980—a level it broadly maintained until 1987. The steady
increase of the efcient unemployment rate from 1951 to 1980 was caused by two factors: a steady
increase of the Beveridge elasticity, from 0.92 in 1951 to 1.24 in 1980 (gure 3, panel B), and a
steady outward shi of the Beveridge curve (gure 1, panel C). Then, in 1988–1991, the efcient
unemployment rate declined sharply to reach 3.6%. That decline was caused both by a attening
of the Beveridge curve (the Beveridge elasticity dropped from 1.24 to 0.91 in 1989), and by an
inward shi of the Beveridge curve (gure 1, panel D). The efcient unemployment rate then
remained very stable throughout the 1990s, 2000s, and 2010s, hovering between 3.3% and 3.9%.
One surprising result is that the efcient unemployment rate did not increase in the aermath of
the 2008–2009 Great Recession, despite the outward shi of the Beveridge curve (gure 1, panel
D). This is because the Beveridge curve also became atter aer 2009, which exactly offset the
outward shi, leaving efcient unemployment almost unchanged by the Great Recession.
Finally, subtracting efcient unemployment rate from actual unemployment rate, we obtain
the unemployment gap. Reecting what we saw with labor market tightness, unemployment
was inefciently high during the entire period, except in 1951–1953, 1965–1970, and 2019. The
mean of the actual unemployment rate over the period is 5.8%, and the mean of the efcient
unemployment rate is 4.1%, so themean unemployment gap for 1951–2019 is 1.7 percentage points.
Moreover, the unemployment gap is sharply countercyclical. It is close to zero (sometimes even
negative) at business-cycle peaks: for instance, -0.4 percentage points in 1953; -0.7 points in 1969;
and 0 points in 1973, 1979, and 2019. And it is largely positive at business-cycle troughs: for instance,
4.3 percentage points in 1958, 3.8 points in 1975, 5.0 points in 1982, 3.9 points in 1992, and 6.2
points in 2009. Unsurprisingly, the largest unemployment gap over the period (6.2 percentage
points) occurred in the wake of the Great Recession.
To summarize, the US unemployment rate appears generally inefciently high; this inef-
ciency is exacerbated in slumps; and the inefciency only disappears in deep booms. These
results have implications for macro policies and macro models. First, given that the unemploy-
ment increases in recessions are inefcient, it is warranted to deploy scal and monetary policy
in slumps to attempt to reduce unemployment. Second, given that the unemployment rate is
almost always inefcient, and sometimes markedly so, it might not be productive to insist upon
modeling the labor market as efcient—either by assuming that the Hosios condition holds, or
by assuming competitive search (Moen 1997).
4.5. Comparison with other unemployment-gapmeasures
For context, we compare our measure of the unemployment gap to other existing measures.
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First, our unemployment gap is higher than the gap between actual unemployment and
its secular trend, because efcient unemployment is lower than trend unemployment. Indeed,
Crump et al. (2019, g. 8) estimate that trend unemployment was around 6% in the 1960s, rose
to 7% in the mid-1980s, remained above 6% until 2000, and slowly declined to 4.5% over the
2001–2019 period. Hence trend unemployment is always at least 0.5 percentage points above
efcient unemployment.
Second, our unemployment gap is higher than the gap between actual unemployment and
the NAIRU, because efcient unemployment is lower than the NAIRU. Crump et al. (2019, g. 8)
estimate that the NAIRU uctuated around 6% in the 1960s, climbed to 8% in the mid-1970s,
remained above 6% until the mid-1980s, stayed in the 5%–6% range until 2010, before falling to
4% in 2016–2018. Thus the NAIRU is always above efcient unemployment, and follows a different
pattern—but they seem to converge at the end of the sample.
Third, our unemployment gap is higher than the unemployment gap computed by the Congres-
sional Budget Ofce (CBO)—which features prominently in scal andmonetary policy discussions
(Dickens 2009, p. 205). The CBO compute the unemployment gap as the distance between actual
unemployment and the “natural” rate of unemployment. They construct the natural rate by
blending trend and NAIRU considerations (Shackleton 2018, app. B). The CBO’s natural unemploy-
ment rate started at 5.3% in 1951, consistently rose to 6.2% in 1979, and from there persistently
declined to reach 4.6% in 2019.6 The CBO’s natural unemployment rate is therefore always above
our efcient unemployment rate, although they were quite close in the 1980s.
4.6. Alternative calibrations the nonpecuniary value of unemployment
Given the uncertainty around the exact nonpecuniary value of unemployment, we consider
alternative calibrations and explore their impact on the efcient unemployment rate.
Our calibration (z = 0.24) implies that the nonpecuniary value of unemployment is much
lower than labor productivity. In contrast, some macro-labor studies argue that unemployed
workers derive signicant utility from leisure and home production. A well-known calibration,
due to Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008), is z = 0.96. Such a calibration has a drastic impact
on efcient unemployment: it implies an efcient unemployment rate always above 13%, and
sometimes as high as 22%; it also implies an average unemployment gap of −11.8 percentage
points (gure 3, panel E). Hence the calibration implies that actual unemployment is always
much too low, even at the peak of the Great Recession—suggesting that such calibration might be
implausible.
6See https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/NROU.
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At the other end of possible calibrations, the nonpecuniary value of unemployment might
be negative. Such calibration would imply that despite free time available for leisure and home
production, unemployed workers suffer from unemployment. This type of calibration may
be unorthodox, but much survey evidence indicates that people incur a signicant cost from
unemployment: Winkelmann and Winkelmann (1998), Di Tella, MacCulloch, and Oswald (2003),
Blanchower and Oswald (2004), and Helliwell and Huang (2014) nd that unemployed workers
reportmuch lowerwell-being than employedworkers even aer controlling for household income
and other personal characteristics. This lower well-being seems to stem from higher anxiety,
lower self-esteem, and lower life satisfaction (Darity and Goldsmith 1996; Theodossiou 1998;
Krueger and Mueller 2011).
To describe the effect of the nonpecuniary value of unemployment on the efcient unem-
ployment rate, we graph the efcient unemployment rates obtained when the nonpecuniary
value of unemployment spans a plausible range: z ∈ [−0.5, 0.96] (gure 3, panel F). For each
nonpecuniary value of unemployment, the efcient unemployment rate is fairly stable over time,
so we summarize its entire time series by its average value over 1951–2019. When the nonpecu-
niary value of unemployment is negative, the efcient unemployment rate is between 3% and
3.6%. Then when the nonpecuniary value rises from 0 to 0.5, the efcient unemployment rate
increases slowly from 3.6% to 5%. Last, when the nonpecuniary value is higher than 0.5, the
efcient unemployment rate grows rapidly: 6% at z = 0.65, 8% at z = 0.8, 11% at z = 0.9, and
17.6% when z = 0.96.
Finally, to provide further perspective, we infer from the calculations the nonpecuniary value
of unemployment that would render US unemployment efcient on average. We nd that to
obtain an average efcient unemployment rate of 5.8%, which is average unemployment rate over
the 1951–2019 period, the required nonpecuniary value of unemployment is z = 0.62. We can also
do the same exercise with the CBO’s natural rate of unemployment. To obtain an average efcient
unemployment rate of 5.5%, which is average value of the CBO’s natural unemployment rate over
the 1951–2019 period, the required nonpecuniary value of unemployment is z = 0.58. Hence, if
the nonpecuniary value of unemployment was around z = 0.6, the US unemployment rate would
uctuate around its efcient value—so the average unemployment gap would be zero—and the
CBO’s natural unemployment rate would overlap with our efcient unemployment rate.
5. Conclusion
This paper develops a method to measure the unemployment gap—the distance between actual
and efcient unemployment rates. We consider a labor-market model with only one structural el-
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ement: a Beveridge curve, which relates unemployment and vacancy rates. Our framework covers
a broad set of modern labor market models, including the Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides model.
In this framework, we express the unemployment gap as a function of actual unemployment
and vacancy rates, and three sufcient statistics: elasticity of the Beveridge curve, nonpecuniary
value of unemployment, and recruiting cost.
With our formula, we measure the unemployment gap in the United States for 1951–2019.
We nd that the US unemployment gap is almost always positive. The gap becomes close to
zero or slightly negative only in deep booms, and it is especially high in slumps. Hence, the US
unemployment rate is generally inefciently high, and such inefciency is especially prominent
in slumps. The implication is that scal and monetary policy could do more to stabilize the labor
market over the business cycle.
We currently have good measures of unemployment and vacancies in the United States (pro-
vided by the BLS), fromwhich we can estimate the Beveridge elasticity. To cement our measure of
the unemployment gap, it would be valuable to obtain more evidence on the two other statistics.
Measuring the time variations of the recruiting cost would be possible by adding new questions
into JOLTS, asking rms to report the number of man-hours devoted to recruiting each month,
in addition to the number of vacancies. Obtaining more estimates of the nonpecuniary value of
unemployment might be feasible by applying the revealed-preference approach of Borgschulte
and Martorell (2018) to other populations (their estimate comes frommilitary personnel). Evi-
dence on the time variations of the nonpecuniary value of unemployment would also be helpful
but is less urgent—because the nonpecuniary value of unemployment only has a small effect
on the efcient unemployment rate around our preferred calibration (gure 3, panel F). Our
methodology could be applied to other countries as well.
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